The Fu Yang 6, a Chinese-flagged vessel, is suspected of deliberately sabotaging undersea fiber-optic cables connecting Taiwan to its outlying islands critical infrastructure owned and operated by Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan’s largest telecommunications provider. The attack involved the use of dual AIS transponders to mask the ship’s true location, suggesting a coordinated effort to disrupt regional communications. The cable damage has led to severe outages, crippling internet, voice, and financial transaction services for businesses, government agencies, and residents in affected areas, including Matsu and Kinmen islands.The sabotage aligns with broader geopolitical tensions, with authorities suspecting state-sponsored interference aimed at undermining Taiwan’s infrastructure resilience. While no immediate data breaches were reported, the prolonged disruption threatens economic stability, national security, and public trust in digital infrastructure. The incident also raises concerns about potential escalation, as undersea cables are vital for military communications and global data flows. Recovery efforts are underway, but the attack exposes vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s critical infrastructure, with long-term implications for cybersecurity and regional stability.
TPRM report: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/chunghwa-telecom-co-ltd
"id": "chu415092125",
"linkid": "chunghwa-telecom-co-ltd",
"type": "Cyber Attack",
"date": "1/2025",
"severity": "100",
"impact": "6",
"explanation": "Attack threatening the economy of geographical region"
{'affected_entities': [{'industry': 'telecommunications',
'location': 'Taiwan and outlying islands (e.g., Matsu, '
'Kinmen)',
'name': 'Taiwan (regional telecommunications '
'infrastructure)',
'type': 'government/critical infrastructure'},
{'industry': 'maritime',
'location': 'near Taiwan',
'name': 'Fu Yang 6',
'type': 'vessel'}],
'attack_vector': ['AIS transponder spoofing/manipulation',
'physical sabotage'],
'description': 'A Chinese-flagged vessel, Fu Yang 6, suspected of involvement '
'in recent undersea cable sabotage near Taiwan, may have been '
'using two AIS transponders simultaneously. This unusual '
'configuration could allow the ship to obscure its true '
'location and activities. The ship has been linked to damage '
'caused to undersea cables connecting Taiwan to its outlying '
'islands, a critical infrastructure for communication. '
'Authorities speculate that the dual AIS setup might be a '
'deliberate tactic for deception, aligning with suspicions of '
'Chinese interference in regional telecommunications and '
'security.',
'impact': {'operational_impact': ['disruption of critical communication '
'infrastructure',
'potential isolation of outlying islands'],
'systems_affected': ['undersea communication cables (Taiwan to '
'outlying islands)']},
'initial_access_broker': {'entry_point': ['physical access to undersea cables',
'AIS transponder deception'],
'high_value_targets': ['undersea communication '
'cables']},
'investigation_status': 'ongoing (suspicions under review by Taiwanese '
'authorities)',
'motivation': ['geopolitical interference',
'disruption of regional telecommunications',
'strategic deception'],
'post_incident_analysis': {'root_causes': ['potential state-sponsored '
'maritime deception tactics',
'vulnerabilities in AIS tracking '
'systems']},
'regulatory_compliance': {'regulations_violated': ['potential violations of '
'international maritime '
'laws (AIS manipulation)',
'critical infrastructure '
'protection regulations']},
'response': {'enhanced_monitoring': ['maritime traffic surveillance near '
'critical infrastructure'],
'law_enforcement_notified': ['Taiwanese authorities',
'potential international maritime '
'regulators'],
'remediation_measures': ['investigation into AIS transponder '
'usage',
'undersea cable repairs']},
'threat_actor': ['suspected state-sponsored (China)',
'Fu Yang 6 vessel operators'],
'title': 'Suspected Undersea Cable Sabotage by Chinese-Flagged Vessel Fu Yang '
'6 Near Taiwan',
'type': ['sabotage', 'deception', 'critical infrastructure attack'],
'vulnerability_exploited': ['lack of AIS authentication mechanisms',
'undersea cable physical exposure']}